


TOP SECRET

25X1



21 March 1960




25X1

Copy No. C 70

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 18
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
6 JUN 1980
DATE: _____ REVIEWER: 25X1



25X1

State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000180001-6

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000180001-6

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

21 March 1960

DAILY BRIEF

25X1

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK
25X1
USSR: [The USSR's proposal of 19 March for a moratorium on small underground nuclear tests not explicitly banned in the US plan appears designed to strengthen Khrushchev's position at the summit in pressing for Western acceptance of the Soviet proposal for a small, fixed number of on-site inspections. Moscow will probably attempt to exploit British inclination to accept a moratorium to increase pressure on the US for an agreement in principle prior to the summit. The Soviet proposal leaves open for bargaining purposes the duration of the moratorium and the post-moratorium status of underground testing if no agreement is reached on improved detection techniques as a result of joint research.]

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

25X1

OK
Ceylon: While the Ceylonese elections of 19 March resulted in a victory for moderate elements, neither of the two rival parties which won the largest number of seats has enough strength in the new parliament to form a government. If these two parties attempt to join forces in a coalition rather than face the prospect of a new election immediately, the coalition would almost certainly be unstable and probably would not last long. [REDACTED]
(Page 4)

25X1

III. THE WEST

OK
Bolivia: Quick suppression of the revolt in Bolivia on 19 March may help the government foster party unity in preparation for the presidential election scheduled for 22 May. There have been rumors that the affair was staged for this purpose. Further disorders are likely. [REDACTED]

25X1

21 Mar 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Nuclear Test Ban Proposal

25X1

[The Soviet proposal on 19 March for a permanent ban on all tests except small underground explosions, which would be covered by a moratorium pending the results of joint research to improve detection techniques, probably is the final element in a comprehensive counterproposal to the limited treaty introduced by the US on 11 February.]

[By linking acceptance of the American limited treaty to a moratorium and a joint research program, the Soviet leadership is apparently attempting to force the US into the position of having to choose between accepting the moratorium concept or rejecting it and risking an open break with London on the issue. Moscow's latest move follows extensive maneuvering to bring the divergence between the American and British delegations on the moratorium issue into the open. US acceptance of the Soviet scheme would, in effect, result in the comprehensive ban on all tests which the USSR has consistently advocated.]

[Moscow has been holding the moratorium in reserve since the chief Soviet delegate explored the matter privately with the British delegation last October. Following the introduction of the American threshold proposal, the Soviet Union gradually moved toward the major points in the American position, without, however, abandoning its insistence on a fixed quota of on-site inspections.]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000180001-6

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000180001-6

25X1

25X1

Iran Plans Full Official Recognition of Israel

25X1

[Iran has never felt a sense of "Moslem solidarity" with the Arab states and is disturbed by both UAR and Iraqi appeals to its Arab minorities. In addition, refusal of the Arab states to support Iran's claims to Bahrein, Arab action in renaming the Persian Gulf the Arab Gulf and, earlier, the lack of Arab support in the oil dispute with Britain have all served to keep Arab-Iranian relations cool.]

25X1

[Iran has long given de facto recognition to Israel, and for several years an unofficial Israeli representative has been in Iran, where there is a sizable Jewish community. An Iranian Foreign Ministry official told the American Embassy recently that an Iranian representative was in Israel handling Iran's affairs there. Iran probably expects that any adverse Arab reaction to Tehran's recognition of Israel will be offset by increased trade, Israeli investment in Iran, and possibly technical assistance from Israel.]

25X1

25X1

Moderate Elements Victorious in Ceylon's National Elections

Moderate candidates soundly defeated the leftists in Ceylon's parliamentary elections on 19 March. The relatively conservative United National party (UNP) and the moderate socialist Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP) won 50 and 46 of the 151 contested seats respectively. The two rival parties may choose to join forces in a coalition government rather than face immediate new elections with interim control by the governor general. Such a coalition government would be unstable in view of personal rivalries and policy disagreements.

Should UNP leader Dudley Senanayake refuse to head a coalition government, as he said he would throughout the campaign, the governor general could ask the next ranking UNP member or possibly the SLFP leader to form a government. Neither alternative would be likely to succeed for long, however, and new elections would probably soon result.

The three main leftist parties are not in a position to make a bid for leadership, either singly or in a coalition. The Trotskyite party, which won second place in the 1956 elections, has suffered considerable losses, probably as a result of reaction against the frequent strikes it organized during the past three years as well as the general trend in favor of the moderate parties. Former Agriculture Minister Philip Gunawardena's Marxist party has made a poor showing despite its strong appeal to Ceylon's majority Sinhalese-Buddhist community. The Communist party ranks lowest of the main parties, having won only three seats.

25X1

25X1

25X1

III. THE WEST

The Bolivian Revolt

Quick suppression of the revolt led by the national police chief in La Paz on 19 March may help the government foster party unity in preparation for the presidential election scheduled for 22 May, but further disorders are still likely. Army, air force, and civilian militia units immediately rallied to the government's support despite recent serious feuding within these units over the rival presidential candidacies of Victor Paz Estenssoro, who appears to have majority support, and Walter Guevara, candidate of a right-wing splinter of the government party.

25X1

There are rumors that the 19 March revolt was staged by the government, which has in the past appeared to use revelations of the ever-present right-wing plotting for its own ends. Reports of casualties, however, including the colonel who was second in command of the insurgents, cast doubt on these rumors.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000180001-6

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
 Scientific Adviser to the President
 Director of the Budget
 Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
 Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
 Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
 Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
 Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
 The Counselor
 Director, International Cooperation Administration
 The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
 The Secretary of the Army
 The Secretary of the Navy
 The Secretary of the Air Force
 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Director, The Joint Staff
 Chief of Staff, United States Army
 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps
 Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
 Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
 Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
 Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Intelligence Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000180001-6

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000180001-6

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000180001-6

TOP SECRET